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Over the last three decades quantum key distribution (QKD) has been intensively studied for the 
unconditionally secured cryptography based on quantum mechanics. Due to the quantum loopholes of 
imperfect detectors, however, QKD has been fragile to quantum hacking. In addition, the lack of 
deterministic single photon and entangled photon pair generations may prevent current QKD from 
commercial applications such as online banking. Here, by using bright coherent light as a photon key 
carrier in paired channels of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI), detection loophole-free photon key 
distribution (PKD) is proposed for the unconditionally secured cryptography, where PKD is compatible 
with current fiber-optic communications networks. The unconditional security of PKD is owing to the 
complete randomness of eavesdropping in the paired channels of MZI. The proposed PKD is distance 
unlimited owing to the compatibility with coherence optics and robust to channel noise and 
intensity/phase fluctuations of the carrier lights owing to the MZI characteristics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The unconditional security in quantum key distribution (QKD) is provided by quantum mechanics of no-cloning 
theorem1 and/or Bell’s inequality.2 However, the unconditional security is not fully guaranteed in practice due to 
mainly the detection loophole by imperfect detectors.3-9 This detection loophole affects all QKD protocols of single 
photon-based3-5, entangled photon-based6-8, and coherent light-based9 (cv) protocols. Thus, the quantum hacking is 
always open to eavesdroppers, and QKD becomes a practical issue unless the detection loophole is completely 
closed.10 For example, in a standard optical fiber whose loss is 10-2 per 100 km, the actual quantum bit rate (QBR) 
drops down to 10-4, resulting in only ~kilo-bits per second (bps) at most8. Besides, other practical issues such as 
nondeterministic single photon and entangled photon-pair generations make current QKD extremely inefficient 
compared with the classical counterpart. Most of all, current QKD is not compatible with conventional fiber-optic 
communications networks mainly due to nonlinear optics devices such as optical amplifiers violating the no-cloning 
theorem. Thus, the transmission distance in QKD has been limited. For multiparty QKD in the future quantum 
networks, multipartite entangled photon pairs are prerequisite but their generation is extremely unrealistic.11 
The one-time-pad cryptography has been a long-lasting goal in human history for a perfect communication 
security. Here, a completely different concept of unconditionally secured photon key distribution (PKD) is presented 
by using classical (coherence) optics in paired channels of Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI). Owing to coherence 
optics, PKD does not rely on nonclassical light and thus free from the no-cloning theorem in QKD. In other words, 
PKD has no limit in transmission distance and QBR is compatible with that in current fiber-optic communications. 
The unconditional security in PKD is based on quantum superposition between the paired channels of MZI, where 
absolute phase information cannot be extracted unless the input phase information is known. Any measurement trial 
in the MZI channels reveals the eavesdropper due to the fringe shift in the output. This fringe shift is compatible 
with the measurement-caused destruction of a quantum state in QKD, resulting in the foundation of the 
unconditional security in a classical version. Although an eavesdropper can technically measure relative phase 
information between the paired channels of MZI without shifting the output fringe, the measured information has no 
meaning due to complete randomness as in BB8412 and E9113 using double polarization/phase bases. Thus, the 
proposed PKD offers a detection loophole-free unconditionally secured cryptography keeping all benefits of 
coherence optics such as cloning, switching, and storing. Owing to the compatibility with current optical systems of 
fiber-optic communications networks, the long-lasting goal of one-time-pad can be implemented by the proposed 
2 
 
PKD due to ultralow error rate at ultrahigh speed. Here, it should be noted that the paired channels of MZI in PKD 
are not for the encoding (by a sender) or decoding (by a receiver) as in current (B91-related) QKD protocols14-16, but 
for the communication channel itself. Unlike all other QKDs relying on no-cloning theorem in a single 
communication channel, the proposed PKD relies on quantum superposition of double communications channels in 
MZI. Therefore, the unconditional security of PKD is not provided by the no-cloning theorem, but by the 
measurement indistinguishability in the double channels of MZI. 
The rate-distance relation of an optical carrier roots in the optical loss in a channel. In a standard optical fiber, 
the polarization and phase of traveling light degrade as it propagates, which is the main bottleneck of the current 
QKDs for long-haul transmission.8 A typical detection efficiency of commercial photodiodes at telecommunication 
wavelengths is about 30%, so the success rate of measurement is roughly one out of three events, resulting in a 
serious chance of eavesdropping.3-9 The first QKD protocol, BB84,12 is based on Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
of two nonorthogonal polarization bases for single photons. Practically, however, BB84-based QKD uses weak 
coherent light with decoy states, but even the decoy states does not guarantee the unconditional security.5 The E91-
based QKD such as MDI- and DDI-QKD based on entangled photon pairs has also been failed in the unconditional 
security due to the detection loophole as well as the Bell’s inequality violation loophole.6-8 Although the optical loss 
in an optical fiber results in exponential decay in the QBR as a function of distance, quantum bit error rate (QBER) 
actually sets the practical upper bound of the QBR due to mainly the detection loophole. Unless the detection 
loophole is completely closed,10,17 current QKD protocols cannot guarantee unconditional security, and their QBR is 
unrealistically low to be commercialized for such as online banking. Most of all, current QKDs are not compatible 
with current optical systems because of the use of nonclassical lights violating cloning. 
Owing to strong demand in both wired and wireless communications, the information traffic in an optical fiber 
has increased three fold every two years over the last thirty years.18 In commercial applications of optical 
communications, a traffic speed of 100 Gbps per (wavelength) channel has been deployed for 80 channels in a dense 
wavelength division multiplexing system, resulting in a total capacity of 8 Tbps in a single-core optical fiber.19,20 
Thus, the capacity per fiber will reach its theoretical upper bound of 100 Tbps in a decade. Eventually a multicore 
fiber will replace the single-core fiber in the near future to overcome the capacity saturation.21 In the multi-core fiber, 
the environmental noise such as vibrations and temperature causing a relative path-length drift in the MZI is frozen 
due to spatial proximity between cores in a micron scale. Thus, the basic infrastructure of the double channels 
satisfying the MZI system for the present PKD is provided with the multicore fiber in the near future fiber-optic 
communications networks. 
To understand the basic physics of the present PKD, we review the beam splitter matrix and the double MZI 
unitary transformation. Then, the PKD protocol is presented in a phase controlled double MZI (PhD-MZI) system, 
where the phase (key) selection by one party is supposed to be automatically confirmed by the other party.22 For 
PKD, we use two phase bases to provide a random eavesdropping chance given by MZI physics. The phase shifter 
Φ in Fig. 1 is used for random phase selection and directional determinacy in the outputs. This directional 
determinacy prohibits the typical intercept and resend technique from eavesdropping (discussed later). Universal 
quantum gate operations such as Hadamard gates have been presented in a phase shifter-coupled MZI.23 The present 
PhD-MZI scheme also satisfies the unitary operation for PKD (analyzed in Figs. 2 and 3). Like the nonorthogonal 
polarization bases in BB84, the phase bases play the same role of indistinguishability-induced randomness in 
measurement due to quantum superposition of the double MZI channels, resulting in prefect randomness for 
eavesdropping. The unconditional security of the present PKD is also achieved by the phase-dependent 
directionality resulting in a distinct visibility. Here, it should be noted that the beam splitter (BS) matrix is sustained 
for both coherence24,25 and incoherence26 optics. For coherence optics, the split lights are perfectly coherent 
regardless of the bandwidth, intensity fluctuation, and phase noise. For incoherence optics, intensity correlation24 (or 
4th order interference) has been proved for a bunching phenomenon with the particle nature of light.27 The present 
PKD belongs to coherence optics but is not limited whether it is a wave (coherent light) or a particle (a single 
photon). 
The BS matrix was firstly discussed in 1979 by Degiorgio24 and generalized in 1980 by Zeilinger,25 where 
there exists a π/2 phase difference between the split lights, the transmitted (E3) and reflected (E4) ones as shown in 
Fig. 1. Thus, the BS matrix [BS] is represented by: 
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[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵] = 1
√2
�1 𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 1�,        (1) 
resulting in 𝐸𝐸3 = 𝐸𝐸1√2 and 𝐸𝐸4 = 𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸1√2 . There is no way to measure the absolute phase of light in each path, unless the 
input light (E1) is given as a reference. More importantly, the measurement itself destroys the key idea of 
indistinguishability in the quantum superposition between two paths in MZI.28 In other words, any trial of 
measurement destroys the interference fringe in the outputs, offering the basic physics of unconditional security. 
Thus, the superposition of two paths in the MZI represents both Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and no-cloning 
theorem even to the bright coherent light. This is the fundamental physics of PKD for the measurement independent 
or detection loophole-free cryptography. Owing to coherence optics of MZI, the compatibility with classical optics 
systems is the intrinsic property of PKD without losing the unconditional security in key distribution process. 
RESULTS 
Quantum superposition of MZI for detection loophole-free measurement 
Figure 1 shows a typical MZI scheme composed of two BSs,22,23,28,29 and the quantum superposition of paths is 
analyzed for the detection loophole-free key distribution. Mirrors are redundant due to the same phase creation in 
both paths. The input light E1 impinges on the first BS (BS1), is separated into two parts (E3 and E4), and is merged 
on the second BS (BS2). Here, the light E3 and E4 are perfectly coherent regardless of the bandwidth, intensity, or 
phase fluctuations of E1. In other words, MZI works even for a single photon whose phase is random as an upper 
bound.22,23,28,29 In Fig. 1a, the MZI matrix representation with a phase shifter Φ is denoted by: [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]φ = 12 � (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) −(1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)�,      (2) 
where [Φ] = �1 00 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� and [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]φ = [BS][Φ][BS]. Thus, the double-pass MZI, [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]𝑖𝑖2  results in an identity 
matrix:  [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]𝑖𝑖2 = (−𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) �1 00 1�,       (3) 
where, the matrix [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]φ satisfies the unitary operation.29 The physical meaning of the unitary transformation by 
MZI is a reversible process, which is the key concept of not only quantum optics30,31 but also coherence optics32,33 
such as photon storage. Here, the global phase has nothing to do with measurements, so is neglected for the unitary 
operation. 
If there is no relative phase difference (φ = 0) between two paths of MZI, the outputs light become 
unidirectional: 𝐸𝐸5 = 0; 𝐸𝐸6 = 𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸1. The factor “i” represents a phase induced by the MZI with respect to the input 
light E1. This phase factor has nothing to do with measurement, either. If a π−phase shift (φ = π) is given in the 
MZI path, then the output light direction is switched: 𝐸𝐸5 = 𝐸𝐸1; 𝐸𝐸6 = 0. Thus, the output directionality of MZI is 
controllable by adjusting the phase φ, resulting in distinctive visibility as shown in Fig. 1b (see the green and red 
dots in the solid curve). These two φ−values of 0 and π are used for potential bases (keys) in the present PKD 
(discussed below). 
Allowing ideal and independent measurements in the paths of MZI without altering the output interference 
fringe, the analysis in both visibility and interference between E3 and E4 gives the basic physics of randomness for 
eavesdropping. The two φ−values used for distinct visibility in Fig. 1b show complete indistinguishability in Fig. 
1c due to the fundamental physics of quantum superposition between two paths in MZI: a definite knowledge for 
one light results in complete randomness in the other. The φ−independent uniform visibility in Fig. 1c is obvious 
due to phase independency in measurements: |𝐸𝐸3|2 = |𝐸𝐸4|2. 
If eavesdropper Eve intrudes into the MZI system to extract the absolute phase information of the light, such a 
trial always accompanies measurement and induces a phase shift to the outputs according to coherence/quantum 
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optics. Thus, such a measurement-induced phase shift results in the visibility change of the outputs, witnessing Eve’s 
existence (see Fig. 1b for φ ∉ {0,𝜋𝜋}). Even if Eve’s measurements induce the same phase shift in both paths, she 
never know whether it is for φ = 0 or φ = π. This is because there is no way to measure the absolute path lengths 
from the BS1 to the measurement positions. Compared with nonorthorgonal polarization bases in BB84, quantum 
superposition between two pathways in MZI gives the same mechanism of randomness for eavesdropping. Thus, the 
quantum superposition of MZI paths results in the closure of the detection loophole in current QKDs. 
 
Figure 1. Detection loophole-free MZI. (a) MZI with a phase shifter  Φ (φ): M, Mirror; BS, beam splitter. 
Ei indicates light field in each region i. (b and c) Visibility Vi,j (solid curve): 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗−𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗+𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖. Ei, coherent light 
pulse; Ii is the intensity of Ei. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  is the interference between 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗  in the unit of I0. The green and 
red dots refer to the basis φ = {0,𝜋𝜋}. 
Figure 2 shows a schematic of the present PKD based on PhD-MZI satisfying identity and inversion matrices. 
The sensitivity of interference and visibility of the output lights E5 and E6, however, is affected by the bandwidth (δf) 
of E1 in terms of coherence length 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐, where 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 and n is the refractive index. In practice, the physical path 
lengths of MZI vary due to environmental noise related to air fluctuations, mechanical/acoustic vibrations, and 
temperature. Locking such noisy environments, however, is just a technical issue as proved in, e.g., gravitational 
wave detections.34 In particular, for a multi-core fiber, the relative path length variation between cores is frozen, 
resulting in noise-free MZI for the present PKD. The noise-free MZI is an essential condition for PKD 
implementation.  
In Fig. 2, the phase shifter Ψ (Φ) is invisible to the outbound (inbound) lights E5 and E6 (E9 and E10). Bob 
randomly selects a phase φ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} for a coherent input light pulse to prepare a key, either for ‘0’ or ‘1,’ and sends 
it to Alice. According to the MZI theory discussed in equation (2) and in Fig. 1, Alice at the output port of the MZI 
surely knows about Bob’s choice by her measurement for visibility VA (=V5,6) by observing A1 and A2. For example, 
if Alice detects only A2 click for E5 (𝑉𝑉5,6 = −1) as shown in Fig. 1b, she definitely knows that Bob prepared it for 
the key ‘1’ with φ = π, unless there is no error: see Table 1a. For the reflected light by the mirror, Alice randomly 
selects her phase basis ψ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} to control her phase shifter Ψ(ψ) and send it back to Bob. The ψ −set output 
light E8 together with E7 is now going back through the same MZI, resulting in the final output lights, E9 and E10 at 
Bob’s side. Here, only the same basis selections (𝜑𝜑 = 𝜓𝜓) result in the identity relation and used for key distribution, 
otherwise discarded (see Tables 1b and 1c). The discarded ones are used for network monitoring of eavesdropping 
(discussed in Fig. 3). 
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Figure 2. A layout of phase-controlled double MZI. LD, Laser; OM, optical modulator; Ai, 
detector at Alice side; Bi, detectors at Bob’s side; BS, 50/50 unpolarized beam splitter; M, 
mirror; Φ, Bob’s phase controller; Ψ, Alice’s phase controller; OD, optical delay; Eve, 
eavesdropper. 
The matrix [BH] for the outputs E9 and E10 in the PhD-MZI PKD of Fig. 2 is represented by: 
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]𝜓𝜓/φ = [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]𝜓𝜓[𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]φ = 12 � −(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓) 𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓)−𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓) −(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓)�,   (4) 
where �
𝐸𝐸9
𝐸𝐸10
� = [𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]𝜓𝜓/φ �𝐸𝐸10 �. From equation (4), the four possible [BH] matrices are obtained: 
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]0/0 = (−1) �1 00 1�,       (5-1) [𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]𝜋𝜋/𝜋𝜋 = �1 00 1�,        (5-2) [𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]0/𝜋𝜋 =  −𝑖𝑖 � 0 1−1 0�,       (5-3) [𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵]𝜋𝜋/0 = 𝑖𝑖 � 0 1−1 0�,       (5-4) 
where each of them satisfies either identity (E9) or inversion (E10) relation: see Table 1b. Thus, Bob also surely 
knows which phase basis is set by Alice by simply observing his detectors B3 and B4 for visibility, V9,10 (=VB). 
As shown in Table 1b, the identity matrix of equations (5-1) and (5-2) is achieved if Alice chooses the same 
basis as Bob does (𝜑𝜑 = 𝜓𝜓), and it is maximally distinguished from the inversion case of 𝜑𝜑 ≠ 𝜓𝜓. Even though the 
same bases of 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜓𝜓 result in the same value of 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = −1, Bob surely knows about Alice’s basis selection because 
he has prepared 𝜑𝜑: see Table 1c. Table 1c summarizes the key distribution determinacy in the present PKD. Unlike 
QKDs, the sifting process is not mandatory in PKD, where the randomness is provided by two superposed paths of 
MZI. In addition to the randomness, path superposition of MZI also offers a great benefit of deterministic 
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information sharing between two parties without leakage or public announcement. This is the unique property of 
PKD, where the upper bound of QBR is 100% of the prepared keys if Alice’s basis selection is deterministic (see 
DISCUSSION). 
Table 1. PKD in PhD-MZI. 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = 𝑉𝑉5,6;  𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = 𝑉𝑉9,10. 
 
Photon key distribution and a QBER map 
Figure 3 shows numerical calculations for Fig. 2 using equation (4). For the identity matrix of equations (5-1) and 
(5-2) with 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜓𝜓, the visibility of 𝑉𝑉9,10(𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵) = −1 is confirmed for key distribution in Figs. 3a and 3b (see the 
green and red dots). For the inversion matrix of equations (5-3) and (5-4) with 𝜑𝜑 ≠ 𝜓𝜓, the visibility of 𝑉𝑉9,10 = +1 
is also confirmed for network monitoring (see the open circles).  
As discussed in Fig. 1c for eavesdropping randomness in MZI, the same analysis is performed for the return 
lights, E7 and E8 for indistinguishability of equation (6), where both fields have the same amplitude but different 
phase determined by φ and ψ: 
�
𝐸𝐸7
𝐸𝐸8
� = 1
√2
�−𝑒𝑒
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓 −𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓
� �𝐸𝐸10 �.      (6) 
As shown in Figs. 3c and 3d, the path analysis of indistinguishability in equation (6) is numerically proved in both 
interference (IN7,8) and visibility (V7,8). Remembering the indistinguishability in the MZI path measurements as 
discussed in Fig. 1c, Eve’s measurement for the return lights (E7 and E8) reveals the same randomness in both 
visibility and interference. Eve never know what basis is chosen by Alice as well as Bob in any case even in the case 
of using the same measurement tool as Alice’s, because the absolute path-length measurement to the tapping 
position is impossible (see Fig. 2). Thus, there is no way for Eve to extract the phase information in the channels of 
the PhD-MZI between Bob and Alice. This is the essence of the detection loophole-free PKD, whose key 
distribution process is entirely automatic owing to the MZI directional determinacy. This automatic key distribution 
process in PKD allows implementations of the one-time-pad cryptography owing to the ultrahigh speed 
deterministic photon key distribution in current optical systems of the fiber-optic communications networks. 
Except for the keys denoted in green and red dots in Fig. 3a, all other points in the φ and ψ coordinates imply 
visibility shifts caused by network errors such as eavesdropping trials (measurement), resulting in a QBER map. In 
the QBER map, such a measurement-caused visibility shift must be random to the Eve’s eavesdropping trial. Once 
Eve is successful for a safe tapping in both channels, the potential phase shift is fixed at one point in the QBER map. 
Assuming no influence on the Bob’s visibility, Eve can measure relative phase difference and trace the change 
dependent upon Bob’s choice of φ. Even in this case, Eve’s extraction probability is random at 50% at each trial 
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because she cannot distinguish between 𝜑𝜑 = 0 and 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜋𝜋. Here, the random chance of eavesdropping for the 
perfect overlap with each dot at 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜓𝜓 = {0,1} is fairly low. This overlapping probability is determined by the 
sensitivity of detectors (~104 in commercially available avalanche photodiodes), where the visibility at each point is 
ultrastable regardless of the intensity or phase fluctuations of the light owing to the benefit of MZI. 
 
Figure 3. Numerical proofs for PKD in Fig. 2. (a and b) Visibility V9,10 for key distribution between 
Alice and Bob. The dashed and dotted curves are interference I9,10 for φ = 0 and π, respectively. (c and d) 
Interference IN7,8 is for eavesdropping randomness. Green and Red dots indicate random keys set by Alice 
with  ψ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} for 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜓𝜓. The open circles in (a) and (c) represent for discarded keys by Alice (see also 
open circles in (b)). Visibility 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗−𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗+𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖: Ii is the intensity of Ei. 
PKD procedure 
The key distribution procedure of the present PKD is as follows (see Table 2): 
1. Bob randomly selects his phase φ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} to create a φ −controlled coherent light pulse via the phase shifter 
Φ and sends it to Alice. Here, the φ −controlled light can be an N-bit chain. 
2. Bob converts his chosen φ into a key in {𝑥𝑥} for a record: x ∈ {0,1}, where x = 0 if φ = 0 and x = 1 if 
φ = π. 
3. Alice measures her detectors A1 and A2 for visibility VA to copy Bob’s key {𝑥𝑥} in {𝑦𝑦} (see Table 1a): y = 0 
if 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = 1; y = 1 if 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = −1; y = V𝐴𝐴 if 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 ≠ ±1; {𝑦𝑦} = {𝑥𝑥}, except for 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 ≠ ±1. Here, 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 ≠ ±1 stands 
for an error due to eavesdropping or network problem: see the red number in Table 2. 
4. Alice randomly selects her phase ψ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} to create a ψ −controlled light pulse via the phase shifter Ψ and 
sends it back to Bob. Here, the ψ −phase control is performed on the reflected φ −controlled light pulse(s). 
5. Alice converts her chosen ψ into a key in {𝑧𝑧} for a record: z ∈ {0,1}, where z = 0 if ψ = 0 and z = 1 if 
ψ = π. 
6. Alice herself sifts her prepared key in {𝑧𝑧} into {𝑎𝑎}: a = y if y − z = 0; a=D if y − z ≠ 0. Here, D stands for 
discarded. 
7. Bob measures his detectors B3 and B4 for visibility VB: w = x if V𝐵𝐵 = −1; w=D if V𝐵𝐵 = 1; w = V𝐵𝐵  if 
𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≠ ±1. This step results in the copy of {𝑎𝑎} into {𝑤𝑤} (see Table 1c). Here, 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≠ ±1 stands for an error due 
to eavesdropping or network problem. 
8. Bob sifts the copied key in {𝑤𝑤} into {𝑏𝑏}: b = w if w − x = 0; b=D if w − x ≠ 0; {𝑤𝑤} = {𝑎𝑎}, except for 
𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≠ ±1. 
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9. Alice and Bob announce their error bits only for 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 ≠ ±1 or 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≠ ±1, and discard the corresponding bits in 
their keys {𝑎𝑎} and {𝑏𝑏}, respectively. Alice and Bob now share the same key {𝑚𝑚}. They never announce their 
selected bases or visibilities. 
According to the detection loophole-free PKD analyzed in Figs. 1~3, however, Alice does not need to randomly 
select her phase basis ψ. In this case, the column numbers 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 are effective, where 6 and 8 are due to 
network errors or eavesdropping trials. 
Table 2. Sequence for PKD in Fig. 2. 
Party 
         Order 
Sequence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 set 
Alice 
3 
VA 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −0.5
∗ 1 −1  
 Copy x: y  0 1 1 0 1 0 0 −0.5 0 1 {𝑦𝑦} 
4 ψ 0 0 π π π 0 π π π 0  
5 z(ψ) 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 {𝑧𝑧} 
6 Sifting y: a 0 D 1 D 1 0 D D D D {𝑎𝑎} 
9 Final key 0 D 1 D 1 D** D D D D {𝑚𝑚} 
Bob 
1 φ 0 π π 0 π 0 0 π 0 π  
2 Prepared key: x(φ) 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 {𝑥𝑥} 
7 
VB −1 1 −1 1 −1 −0.8
∗ 1 −1 1 1  
Copy A: w 0 D 1 D 1 -0.8 D 1 D D {𝑤𝑤} 
8 Sifting w: b 0 D 1 D 1 D D 1 D D {𝑏𝑏} 
9 Final key 0 D 1 D 1 D D D** D D {𝑚𝑚} 
*The numbers in red refer to network errors or eavesdropping. 
**Only error bits are announced publically to discard the corresponding bit from the final key set {𝑚𝑚}. Here, D 
represents an error bit and can be set to any number, e.g., D=9 for a computing algorithm. 
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = 𝑉𝑉5,6;  𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = 𝑉𝑉9,10. 
DISCUSSION 
Deterministic key distribution in PKD 
The deterministic key distribution is possible due to detection loophole-free PKD in the MZI path superposition of 
Fig. 2. As will be discussed below in the Initialization procedure for PKD, Eve cannot extract the Bob’s chosen 
phase. Compared with BB84 based on post-measurement sifting process with the random basis selection, the 
randomness in PKD comes from the path superposition of MZI, so that deterministic basis selection is possible. In 
this case, the upper bound of QBR in PKD is 100%. As shown in Fig. 2, the deterministic basis selection is 
technically obtained by the A3/A4 detector-triggered control for the phase shifter Ψ. The reason of random basis 
selection by Alice in Table 2 is not necessary. 
Multicore fiber-optic networks 
In the fiber-optic communications networks, the PhD-MZI configuration of Fig. 2 is satisfied by a multicore fiber 
(see Fig. 4). Although the intrinsic characteristics induced by material itself are slightly different among cores in a 
multicore fiber, the relative refractive index change by nosey environments is nearly zero due to the micron scale 
proximity between cores enclosed by a cladding. Thus, the MZI configuration of a multicore fiber should be robust 
to the environmental noise for the present PhD-MZI system. For the applications of PKD, current ~100 km spaced 
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EDFA fiber optic networks are perfectly fit, where the MZI length becomes unlimited due to the coherence nature of 
light via coherent amplifications at EDFA and modulations. This unlimited transmission distance is the 2nd novelty 
of the present PKD, where photon cloning by EDFA is basically phase-locked process, resulting in a fixed phase 
shift. The fixed phase shift in the cloning process can be technically adjusted for visibility of outputs.  
 
Figure 4. A schematic of optical fiber-based PKD. L, Laser; OM, optical modulator; OD, optical delay; 
Ai, detector at Alice side; Bi, detectors at Bob’s side; M, mirror; Φ, phase controller at Bob’s side; Ψ, 
phase controller at Alice’s side. Ei, coherent light pulse. C, 50/50 fiber coupler. 
Initialization procedure for PKD 
Regarding the phase-dependent visibility VA in Figs. 1b and 3b, Alice does not know what phase basis is set by Bob 
unless the network (MZI) configuration is known. To solve this problem, Alice may scan her phase shifter Ψ(δ) and 
fix it with a correct δ for a maximum visibility VA. The value of VA, however, is random until Alice knows Bob’s 
choice of φ. This situation applies to Eve exactly in the same way. To solve this dilemma, i.e., to let Alice know 
secretly the φ valve set by Bob, the following initialization stage is needed before starting the PKD procedure. 
Table 3. Initialization for PKD. 
Party 
     Order (N) 
Sequence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alice 
1 Ψ δ δ δ+π δ δ+π δ+π δ δ+π δ δ+π 
3 VA 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 
Bob 
2 φ 0 π π 0 π π 0 0 π 0 
4 Correctness √ √  √   √  √  
*𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = 𝑉𝑉5,6. 
The preparation stage for PKD in Table 3: 
1. Alice randomly selects additional phase α ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} to add the fixed δ for Ψ. 
2. Bob randomly selects φ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋}, and sends the φ-encoded light to Alice. 
3. Alice measures VA and publically announces the results. 
4. Bob publically announces the correctness with respect to the Alice’s results. 
Table 3 shows the initialization procedure how the φ −dependent directionality in Fig. 1 is effective. First, 
Alice randomly sets her phase controller Ψ with either the δ obtained in the scanning stage or δ+π. Second, Bob 
randomly selects φ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋} for the light pulse E4 and sends it to Alice along with E3. Third, Alice publically 
announces her measurement results of VA. She never announces her phase choices for Ψ. Lastly, Bob publically 
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announces the correct ones with respect to Alice’s VA results. Then Alice knows secretly whether the δ is correct or 
π−phase shifted: Table 3 is for the correct δ. Here, Eve can know the tendency of the φ −dependent VA even 
without the correct δ by doing the same measurement as Alice does and by tracing the public announcements, if 
there is no random selection in the phase choice by Bob and Alice. To surprise, the unconditional security in PKD is 
done by classical (coherent) light pulses. 
In conclusion, a novel coherence optics-based PKD protocol is proposed, analyzed, and discussed to 
overcome the low QBR, rate-distance dependency, transmission limitations, and conditional security in conventional 
QKD protocols limited by detection loophole as well as by the inconvenience of nonclassical lights. The physics of 
the proposed PKD is in the quantum superposition of paired channels in MZI, where no-cloning theorem and 
randomness in current QKD are replaced by the path superposition of coherent lights. The unconditional security in 
the proposed PKD is rooted in the coherence nature of the MZI system, where the detection loophole is closed 
perfectly regardless of detector efficiency. Eventually, all-optical computers35 can be directly combined with the 
present PhD-MZI system for all-in-one secured information processing and communications. The present PhD-MZI 
scheme is also applicable for wireless36 or satellite37 PKD via MIMO38 technologies with coherent light (discussed 
elsewhere). 
METHODS 
The numerical calculations in Figs. 1 and 3 were performed by Matlab using equations appeared in the text. The data 
that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 
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